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Côte d'Ivoire and Ghana are adjacent states on the
West African coast, one an ex-British the other an
ex-French colony. They are, at least superficially,
similar in geographic, economic and sociological
terms. Yet their post-independence political and
economic histories have diverged quite markedly,
providing the occasion for a continuing debate on the
causes of these contrasting outcomes.' Côte d'Ivoire's
spectacular growth rates in the 1960s and 1970s,
fuelled by foreign investment and the expansion of
cocoa and coffee exports, were said to prove the
superiority of opening up the economy to the
disciplines of the international market. Ghana's
economic decline, to the point where the state had lost
control of its currency and agricultural exports
dropped to levels below those of the 1920s, was held up
as a warning against state-led protected industriali-
sation.2 Now that Côte d'Ivoire, as the world's largest
cocoa producer, is facing the worst economic crisis in
its entire history as a result of falling commodity prices
and the burden of 1970s foreign debts, the debate as to
whether reliance on primary exports leads inevitably
to structural failure and political collapse has been
revived.
The purpose of this paper is, however, to argue that
the really significant differences between Ghana and
Côte d'Ivoire lie not in the realm of economic policy
but in state-society relations and state capacity. With
the exception of a brief experiment with rapid state-led
industrialisation, 1960-66 (which apparently owed
more to Rostow and Hirschman than to Karl Marx4),
Ghana has continued throughout its post-
independence history to be as dependent on its cocoa
export economy as Cote d'Ivoire; but it has been less
successful at managing that economy both in the
'See: P. Foster and A. Zolberg, Ghana and the Ivory Coast:
Perspectives on Modernization (Chicago, 1971); J. Woronoff, 'Ivory
Coast; the value of Development' and A. G. Rondos, 'ivory Coast:
the Price of Development' in Africa Report, 24,4, 1979; C. Young,
Ideology and Development in Africa (New Haven. 1982).
2S. Amin, Le Développement du Capitalisme en Côte d'ivoire (Paris,
1967); E. Eshag and P. J. Richards, 'Comparison of Economic
Developments in Ghana and the Ivory Coast since 1960',Bulletin of
the Oxford Unis'ersity instituteof Statistics,Nov. 1967; World Bank,
AcceleratedDevelopment in Sub-Saharan Africa (Washington, 1981).
5N. Ridler, 'Comparative Advantage as a Developmental Model -
the Ivory Coast', Journal of Modern African Studies, 23,3, 1985;
Y. Fauré, 'Côte d'ivoire: Une Crise et Son Analyse', Conference on
West African States, SOAS, Centre for African Studies, June 1987.
4T. Killick, Development Economics in Action (London, 1978) p.21.
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'macro' and 'micro' senses. Nor is it an accident that
the principal political contrast between the two
countries is in their respective records of political
stability.
Côte d'Ivoire has been ruled not just by the same
regime but by the same small leadership group
associated with Houphouet Boigny since 1952, when
the French colonial administration decided to co-opt
Houphouet's party (the PDCI) as their local
successors. Although the regime has both destroyed or
co-opted opposition where necessary and slowly
admitted younger generations, it is virtually a
gerontocracy, now displaying dangerous immobilisme
as the aged President resolutely postpones all
questions of the succession. Ghana, on the other hand,
since the overthrow of its decolonisation regime in
1966 (the CPP had ruled from 1951, six years before
independence) has experienced seven changes of
regime - two elected and five military - and an even
greater number of governmental changes and
attempted coups d'etat. Its current government, that
of Flight Lieutenant Jerry Rawlings, has survived at
least six coup attempts since 1982, partly through
Rawlings' ability to deal ruthlessly with the army, and
partly because the World Bank and the IMF have
provided enough cash to fund life-saving improvements
in the economy. Its future remains precarious.5
My principal focus is to try to explain, through
comparison, Côte d'Ivoire's stability and Ghana's
endemic instability, and to establish the consequences
of all of this for the state's effectiveness in the
implementation of an economic strategy. At the root
of these differing histories are differences between
Ivorian and Ghanaian societies, and the processes of
political elite and state formation in each country. It
will be argued that the most powerful explanation of
the different outcomes is to be found in the different
kinds of interaction which have occurred between
state and civil society. These may be briefly described
as differences in the relative 'balance' or 'proportion'
between state and civil society in each country.
5See: B. Agyeman-Duah, 'Ghana 1982-6; the Politics of the PNDC
Journal of Modern African Studies, 25,4, 1987; D. Ray, Ghana:
Politics, Economics andSociety (London, 1986); N. Chazan 'Politics
and the State in Ghana' and R. Jeffries, 'The Political Economy of
Personal Rule in Ghana', Conference on WestA frican States, SOAS,
CentreforAfri can Studies, June 1987; J. Haynes, 'Rawlings and the
Politics of Development Policy in Ghana 1979-86' unpublished
PhD thesis, Staffordshire Poytechnic, 1988.
State, Society and Political Institutions in Côte d'Ivoire
and Ghana
The term 'civil society' in this paper refers to all of
those self-conscious associations and institutions
representing private interest groups and local, class,
religious and intellectual 'publics' which tend to
emerge with the rise of a market economy.6 It thus
encompasses but is not confined (as in Marx's use) to
the social relations of particular forms of production
and exchange. These institutional and associational
forms in fact mediate between the state and
individuals qua economic actors, and thus have
political significance. The realm of the state begins at
the points where the state enforces, upholds or
represses particular relationships within civil society.
In Ghana, a relatively strong state has been balanced
by an equally strong yet highly fractured civil society,
control of which has been difficult to establish; in Côte
d'Ivoire, what began as a weakly established post-
colonial state was able ultimately to overwhelm and
dominate an even weaker and underdeveloped civil
society.
A thorough analysis of all of this would require a
detailed discussion of the social and political histories
of Côte d'Ivoire and Ghana in the pre-colonial and
colonial periods, but in this abbreviated assessment it
will suffice to note a few important points. Côte
d'Ivoire and Ghana have long been very similar in
terms of geography and, more importantly, political
economy. Both colonial states were 'neo-mercantilist'
inasmuch as they monopolised surpluses from peasant
production of primary products which were then
exported in concert with foreign businesses. This
system reinforced the centrality of the state and the
political elite as sources of accumulation and
patronage politics. The explanation for Côte d'Ivoire's
continued success at maintaining effective mechanisms
for controlling, taxing and encouraging such pro-
duction and export, and for the Ghanaian state's
failure in these areas, is bound up with the histories of
their civil societies, elite-formation and state-society
relations since the mid-colonial period.
Ghana has always been more densely populated and
more highly urbanised than Côte d'Ivoire. The
peoples of Côte d'ivoire - unlike those of Ghana -
were scattered groups of refugees and migrants from
other areas Of West Africa. As a result, whereas in
Ghana social and political identities and local political
life were legacies of the highly articulated core states
and urban centres that pre-dated colonial rule, in Côte
d'Ivoire there were very few state-organised identities
or pre-colonial centres of power which could underpin
an autonomous 'African' civic life.7 The standard
classification of Côte d'Ivoire's population into its
main ethnic groups was largely an invention of
colonial ethnography, and this meant that local
6G. Poggi, The Development of the Modern State (London, 1978)
pp.77 and 81.
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communities there - unlike Ghana - had a rather
weak political self-consciousness. The system of
colonial rule in Ghana catalysed social conflict (and
consciousness), locally based legal systems and a neo-
traditional elite which championed indigenous land
claims. None of this occurred in Côte d'Ivoire until
very late - the coffee and cocoa booms of the 1960s
and 1970s - when migrations triggered mutterings of
discontent about indigenes' land rights. Such issues
had been salient in Ghana since the 1920s.
The rich peasant/small town society of southern
Ghana which emerged during the colonial period was
rooted in local communities with highly elaborated
political, social and legal institutions and identities.
The vigour of local political life and the degree of
participation which developed, even before the party
conflicts of the decolonisation period, have been
recorded by numerous local studies. It is only when the
party, associational or class groupings and neo-
traditional mobilisations of the 1950s/60s are added
to this legacy that some idea of the self-consciousness
and strength of Ghanaian civil society can be grasped.
In Côte d'Ivoire there are very many fewer of these
local communities; and those that did exist, far from
being politically and legally 'moralised', were
systematically crushed by colonial policy. The land
free-for-all of the 1960s, with its anarchic and
sometimes violent conflicts, was only possible against
societies too weak to resist. It is difficult to imagine a
similar process having occurred in Ghana.
Political Elites and State Formation
(j) Côte d'Ivoire
The general underdevelopment of local communities
and the weak constitution of civil society in Côte
d'Ivoire was compounded and reinforced during the
1950s with the rise of an African successor elite. This
was a crucial period in the formation of patterns of
interaction between the nascent post-colonial state
and society. Much has been written about the so-called
'planter bourgeoisie' which was said to be the basis of
Houphouet-Boigny's early election victories and his
subsequent rise to power.8 It is true that his fight to
obtain labour supplies for the large coffee planters of
the Syndicat Agricole Africain (who were disgruntled
by the forced labour made available to the small
number of white planters) gave him a particular power
base, which was also predominantly from the central
(Baoulé) region and the ethnic associations of
Abidjan.9 But even in the very limited elections of the
A. Zolberg, One Party Government in the Ivory Coast (Princeton,
1964); L. Mytelka, 'Foreign Business and Economic Development
ini. W. Zartman and C. Delgado (eds.) The PoliticalEconomy ofthe
ivory Coast (Princeton, 1984); Y. A. Fauré and J. F. Medard, Etat et
Bourgeoisie en Côte d'ivoire (Paris, 1982); B. Campbell, 'ivory
Coast' in J. Dunn (cd.) West African Stares (Cambridge, 1978).
9Zolberg, One Party Government, pp.67-8
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late 1940s and early 1950s - an electorate of one-
seventh of the adult population in 1952 his electoral
machine was both broader and shallower than this.
The original leadership group, as Zolberg pointed out
25 years ago, was predominantly fromthe tiny evalué
elite junior civil servants, teachers, pharmacists -
Houphouet's classmates from the Ecole William
Ponty in Dakar.'°
Like Houphouet, many of them had commercial
farms; but once they had made their accommodation
with the French in 1951, the logic of state-centred
accumulation of power and wealth set in - and with it
a process of departicipation and statis. No PDCI
congress was held between 1949 and 1959, the crucial
years of power consolidation. The original leadership
clique stayed in power, intermarrying and creating
their own elite family corporations. Neither local
party democracy nor formal local government or
community politics were developed.'1 The party's
election victory in 1957 - the first under universal
suffrage - was a product of elite power-broking
(including the whites in the colony) and local party
machines run by centrally appointed secretaries. The
trajectory of the centralised, highly policed French
prefectoral administration continued uninterrupted.
The opposition which emerged, predominantly from
areas threatened by the coffee and cocoa expansion, or
the 'original' cocoa elites of the southeast, was fairly
easily crushed or co-opted on terms set by the PDCI.
The early possession and use of state power by this
group had more to do with their survival in office until
independence than any popular 'peasant' base. The
smoothness of this capture was also aided by the lack
of mobilisation or representation of associational
groups or other institutions within the state. An
Ivorian bureaucracy, for instance, hardly existed. In
1957, there was not a single African in an executive
position in the civil service. Even in the lower grades of
white collar employment, foreign Africans
(Dahomeyans, Senegalese, Togolese) dominated; one
third of all clerical recruits in 1954 were foreign
Africans. 12 The inevitable Ivorian protests against
both whites and foreign Africans were crushed by the
PDCI government. A junior civil servants strike in
1959 organised by the nascent Ivorian union
movement led to wholesale sackings. Whilst it was
convenient for the regime to continue using European
administrators (in 1965, 80 per cent of managerial
cadres in the civil service were expatriates, a figure
which still stood at 48 per cent in 1973)" discontent
'°lbid.
il They were in fact positively discouraged; see M. Cohen, 'Urban
Policy and Development Strategy' in Zartman, Political Economy,
p.64.
2 Zolberg, One Party Governn,ent, pp.101 and 246.
R. Clignet and P. Foster, Convergence and Divergence in
Educational Development in Ghana and the Ivory Coast' in Foster
and Zolberg, Ghana and theivory Coast, p.287; RCI, Ministère de la
Fonction Publique, Regards sur ¡a Fonction Publique, ¡975.
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could be managed by getting rid of foreign Africans
and admitting a slow trickle of Ivorians. Thus an
indigenous civil service did not emerge until after
independence, and then it was very much a creature of
the regime, recruited and controlled by the political
elite.
Neither trade unions nor the bureaucracy presented
any autonomous challenge to the PDCI in the 1950s.
The same could be said for business elites, farmers
and, after the crises of 1959-63, the educated middle
classes and the university. Like the civil service, an
Ivorian business class hardly existed. Nor has the
PDCI regime showed until recently any interest in a
policy for 'national capitalism'. Nearly 30 years after
independence, foreign, particularly French firms
dominate the manufacturing, financial and agri-
business private sectors; and Ivorianisation of private
managerial cadres still has a long way to go (only
32 per cent of top management and 62 per cent of
'cadres supérieurs' in 1984)t4. In the small and medium
sector - taxis, transport, shopkeeping, up-country
crop buying - one need only note that there are
around 100,000 Lebanese in Côte d'Ivoire, the largest
Lebanese community in the world outside the
Lebanon.tt Ivorian business is very dependent on state
patronage, either in the crop-trading field or through
the parapublic sector which boomed so dramatically
in the 19705t6
The regime's connection with cash crop farming
interests through the Syndicat Agricole Africain
(SAA) was of a very particular kind. Farmers had
never been mobilised in 'mass movements' such as
those associated with the pre-war cocoa hold-ups in
Ghana. Ethnic stratification and the migration and
land issues, as indicated earlier, also meant that a
united organisation comparable to the Ghana
Farmers Congress (GFC) in the 1940s never engaged
in Côte d'Ivoire, even though in class terms the
leadership of the GFC was, like that of the SAA, a
similar blend of larger planter and cocoa broking
interests. In Ghana the farmers' organisation gave
conditional support to the nationalist movement
which, after the break with the CPP over the
marketing issue, was the basis for an equally
autonomous focus of opposition)7 In Côte d'Ivoire
the SAA coffee planters elite was not at loggerheads
with the state in the l940s and 1950s over the general
issue of marketing; on the contrary, it was busy
arranging a special deal with the French to give special
prices and protected quotas in the French domestic
market to the coffee produced during the l950s
Rd. Ministère du Travail et de l'lvoirisation, Le Secteur Privé et
Semi-public en Côte d'ivoire: Principaux Resultats 1984.
'5La Côte d'ivoire en Chiffres 1986-7, p.19.
See: Fauré, '. . . une Crise el son Analyse'.
See: B. Beckman, Organising the Farmers: Cocoa Politics and
National Development in Ghana (Uppsala, 1976).
expansion. ' It is difficult to disentangle in this deal the
interests of the elite as holders of state power from
their interests in the coffee industry. Whilst the price
deal obviously benefitted all farmers, (and cemented
the policy commitment of the political elite to export
crop expansion) the special interests of the elite were
soon manifested in the 'open door' policy on
immigration which produced the extraordinary flood
of foreign migrants into the rural areas in the 1960s;
again whilst plentiful labour supplies benefitted larger
farmers, not all migrants intended to be - or remain
- labourers. The pressure of both foreign and internal
migrations, together with the free land policy
produced fragmentation in the farming community
along ethnic and regional lines.'9 The political
representation of farming interests offered by the
SAA/PDCI axis was therefore always very partial; but
representation and eventually opposition outside its
framework took an ethnic/regional form, and was
thus easily marginalised or crushed.
Finally, an organised educated/professional middle
class interest hardly existed in the 1950s, outside the
very small group already incorporated into the PDCI.
There was no university, and the small number of
students in higher education (about 850 by 1960) were
mainly in France or Senegal.2° School enrolment of
the 5 to 19 age group even by 1965 was only 29 per
cent, compared to Ghana's 55 per cent, and was even
more highly skewed regionally, being almost
exclusively southern.2' The founding of the University
of Abidjan in 1960 led initially (and typically) to a
large influx of foreign students; of the 1,900 students
enrolled in 1965, only one third were Ivorians!
Nevertheless it was from 'radical' students that
Houphouet experienced his first real challenges in the
late 1950s leading to the formation of the PDCI's
youth wing in 1958 which was quickly destroyed in the
plot upheavals of 1963.22 The weakness of the students
and intellectuals was that they had no real local base.
They were mainly 'returnees' looking for jobs in a very
small market where the deliberately slow replacement
of expatriates was the government's principal
controlling mechanism.
Since independence the education system has
expanded massively at the lower levels - the
government spends more than any in Africa - but its
products are still treated with extreme caution, and
not without reason. Even though the majority of
secondary school teachers were French until the early
1980s, (now reduced to about 30 per cent)23 the
teaching unions and university students have regularly
' Zolberg, One Party Government, p.167.
3Chauveau and Dozon, 'Au Coeur des Ethnies
20den Tuiner, Challenge of Success, p.279.
2! Clignet and Foster, 'Convergence and Divergence . . .' p.273.
22 Zolherg and Foster, Ghana and the Ivory Coast, p.16.
23 Ministère du Travail, Le Secteur Privé ....p.89.
provided some of the rare ripples in the smooth
surface of political conformity maintained by the
regime.24 But such dissent has never been allowed to
persist; the lesson of the affair of the PDCI youth wing
remained firmly imprinted on Houphouet's mind, and
the original weakness of this group in social terms has
been maintained politically through ruthless control
of the job market and manipulation of the 'foreigner'
factor. Whenever resentments against whites or
foreign Africans build up, the government can buy
popularity by generously mitigating the effects of its
own policies. It is no accident that the recent slow-
down in economic expansion has led to a rapid speed-
up of ivorianisation.2' Only when that process is fully
completed will the regime have to look for an
alternative safety valve - and hope meanwhile for a
recovery of the cocoa market!
Overall therefore the political elite which took power
under French colonial tutelage in 1952 was able to
build an Ivorian state very much on its own terms. The
weakness and the lack of mobilisation of civil society,
both in local community and associational and class
dimensions, was such that the state was relatively free
to choose what to incorporate and what to ignore or
crush, Such contestations as did emerge did not
permeate the state or seriously challenge elite unity
and strength. The externality of the colonial state was
reproduced but, unlike in Ghana, the lack of any
agreed identity or legitimacy for the state hardly
mattered. In spite of the view of some scholars that the
Ivorian state represents the 'baoulisation' of society,26
the Ivorian governing class has always been
notoriously unconcerned about what it means to be an
Ivorian; official propaganda peddles a rather feeble
'folk-lore' image of a pluralistic nation of village
farming communities each with its own 'customs'.
This rather unconvincing effort conceals not tribal
dominance but the emergence of a powerful,
centralised 'Abidjan' elite rooted in the state and its
mercantile dependents. The cultural identity of this
elite - increasingly multi-ethnic in origin although
still southern Akan dominated - is unashamedly
modern, French and nouveau riche/wealth seeking.
The autonomy of the state owes much, therefore, to
the legacy of the decolonisation period and to the
economic and political links established with France
in the 1950s. But that is by no means the whole story.
What happened after independence was even more
extraordinary. Whilst the weakness of indigenous
v See, for instance the recent government conflict with the teachers'
union which resulted in the imprisonment of teachers' leaders and
the imposition of government nominees as union officials:
G. Bourke, 'An autocratic democrat', West Africa, 1-7 May, 1989.
25 N. Yen and 1. F. Lébry, '14,5 milliards d'économie grâce à la
réduction des experts', Fraternité Matin, 6942, 30 Nov. 1987;
Ambassade de France, La coopération franco-ivoirienne 1987
(Abidjan, 1988).
26 Chauveau and Dozon, 'Au Coeur des Ethnies.
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society was perpetuated through continuing departi-
cipation, the state grew out of all proportion to that
society using foreign factors of production.
The number of foreigners in Côte d'Ivoire is not just a
useful addition to the labour supply, to be celebrated
by liberal economists; it is central to one's
understanding of the regime. The Ivorian state has
created a kind of regional 'colony in reverse'. The
territory has been offered as a market and an 'empty
land' for migrants to 'make their fortune'. The
development of the territory for cocoa and coffee
exports, agribusiness and local manufacturing would
not have been possible without foreign labour from
the West African region and Europe, foreign capital
and the substantial internal migrations. The
importance of French and Lebanese business, and
expatriate managerial cadres in the private and public
sectors had already been mentioned. Here, the state's
maintenance of the French backed CFA currency has
been crucial.
In the urban and rural unskilled sectors the foreign
labour attracted by the 'open door' and the cocoa rush
was equally important. In 1973,25 per cent of the total
population was foreign (30 per cent if children born to
foreigners were included); even in 1985, with the onset
of the crisis, it was still 20 per cent.27 But these figures
do not convey the full significance of the immigrants.
As over half the total population are children,
immigrants form a much higher proportion of the
work force; 41 per cent of those aged between 15 and
60 in 1980!28 Foreign Africans accounted for 57 per
cent of all jobs in the urban 'informal and artisan'
sector in 1976, and 42 per cent in the overall 'unskilled
modern sector'.29 In the primary sector, they
accounted for a staggering 72.7 per cent of all paid jobs
in 1971 - reflecting the fact that Ivorian farmers are
either 'self-employed' - or employers.30 Even as a
proportion of total population the figure reaches
50 per cent in some southern districts, and over 30 per
cent in the new cocoa areas.3'
Using these foreign factors of production, the Ivorian
state facilitated - indeed through its own investments
participated in - the successful economic boom of the
1960s and 1970s. It also used the wealth so created to
expand itself enormously, yet without any integration
with or obligation to the social basis of that wealth.
The greater part of 'Ivorian' society is outside the
boundaries of the Ivorian political community. State
expansion, apart from creating channels of patronage
17den Tuinder, Challenge of Success, p.124; INADES-docu
mentation, Etude des Consequences Sociale de la Politique de
Développement en Côte d'ivoire (Abidjan, ¡NADES, 1986), mimeo
p.'0.
u Calculated from data provided in Plan Quinquennial /981-85, p.590.
"Ibid., p.63.
'°den Tuinder, p.130.
"¡NADES, Etudes. . ., p.9.
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whose attractions were irresistible, created an
administrative and security machine which is out of all
proportion to the small size and weakness of what
remains of an indigenous civil society. The distance
between the state and the peasant villager or urban
labourer, both in cultural and power terms, is much
greater now than in colonial times. Control
mechanisms are formidable, participation (notwith-
standing recent attempts at reform) virtually nil. In
this highly policed society, challenge from autonomous
community or associational groupings is unlikely; and
the rewards of cooperation overwhelming.
The Abidjan state has therefore built itself without
needing to worry about integrating social conflicts
which could reproduce themselves within the political
arena. The real conflicts over land and labour present
in the agrarian economy have not been represented
politically by ethnic 'barons'; Houphouet-Boigny's
famed skill at ethnic balancing has in fact been more of
a token cooptation of educated elites and technocrats,
Anybody seen as a real challenge with a potential
following is excluded. The likeliest sources of elite
disunity are internal - personal or familial factions,
generational or institutional conflicts including the
fully integrated Armed Forces.32
The Ivorian state machine which, it is argued, has
maintained effective control over this 'colonial'
economy, is very obviously the creature of the political
elite whose economic policies have produced the
resources for its expansion. Elite consensus and
coherence, together with management of the ivoriani-
sation of a highly foreign-dominated administrative
and managerial sector, have maintained strong forms
of accountability in the administration. This is
because political controls can be combined with an
ostensibly technocratic and meritocratic ideology.
The restricted output of highly educated manpower
has meant that the very possession of the requisite
educational qualifications is evidence of elite
membership (like the 'Oxbridge' origins of the English
ruling class).33
Within these basic educational parameters, the pace of
ivorianisation and of expansion have enabled the
regime to manipulate (until recently) a relative fit
between the number of candidates and jobs. This
permits the preservation of meritocratic criteria whilst
'political' criteria can be used in the more subtle
allocation of different types of jobs and postings. An
explanation of this system in terms of 'personal rule'
or the 'charisma' of Houphouet-Boigny is redundant.
The power, the autonomy, the wealth and the unity of
32 Senior military officers have been given cabinet posts in recent years
and are to be found in larger numbers in the prefectoral service. As
the rise and fall of Lamine Fadika (Minister of the Navy) between
1974 and 1987 shows, it is better to have young ambitious officers in
the cabinet as it enables the political leadership to smell trouble very
quickly.
"den Tuinder, p.279; Clignert and Foster, p.275.
the political elite, and the lack of alternatives where
even the wealthier foreign sector is intimately linked to
the state, give a convincing enough account of the
loyalty and effectiveness of the administration. Indeed
if it were more purely 'personal', how could the state
have escaped the destructive and chaotic corruption of
Mobutu's Zaire?34
(ii) Ghana
In comparing the formation of political elites and the
post independence state in Ghana during the same
period, the contrasts could not be more striking. Not
only was the basic constitution of civil society stronger
and more autonomous; the 1950s saw a growth in
participation, and in associational and class formation
which gave a political structuring to society that has
determined all subsequent conflicts. These conflicts
have been consistently reflected within the realm of the
state, which itself possessed a more highly articulated
machinery.
The Convention People's Party initially put together
in 1949 a national coalition of farmers' associations,
trade unions, small businessmen, white collar workers
and community-based 'youth associations' (some of
which would be called ethnic in Côte d'Ivoire). The
prior mobilisation of the rural areas over the cocoa
'swollen shoot' disease and price/marketing issues,
and the mobilisation of the urban massses through the
Boycott Committees (organised to protest against
European business) had already been intense.35 When
the cocoa farmers broke with the CPP after its election
victory in 1951 and its subsequent decision to follow
the colonial line on a marketing system for the cocoa
exports, the CPP did not shrink to being just an elite
with state power. Nor, in spite of the emergence of
regionalist parties in the North and amongst the Ewe
irredentists on the Togo border, could it be called an
ethnically organised or interested party. Throughout
the 1950s, fighting two democratic general elections
and innumerable local elections in the new local
government systems designed by colonial reformers to
u in Zaire state offices are given out as 'prebends' by Mobutu and his
familial ruling group, and hence systematic plunder, anarchy and
inefficiency are endemic in the state machine; in Côte d'ivoire,
whilst the political and commercial elites undoubtedly benefit from
patronage (as in the parastatal corporations and the crop trading
system) there is little evidence to show from recent observation of
various Ministries (including the Prefectoral service) that the
ivorian bureaucracy has been 'patrimonialised' in the strict sense of
this term. Many bureaucrats and technocrats including ex-Prefects
have been formally co-opted into the political elite but this can be
compared to the very similar career trajectories of bureaucrats in
French politics. See: R. Crook, 'Patrimoriialisni, Administrative
Effectiveness and Economic Development in Côte d'ivoire' African
Affairs, 88, April 1989. See also C. Young and T. Turner, TheRise
and Decline of the Zairian State (Madison, 1985); T. M. Callaghy,
The Sta/e-Sacie! r Struggle: Zaire in Comparative Perspective (N.Y.,
1984).
35 See: D. Austin, Politic.t in Ghana 1946-60 (London, 1964) for a
general account of this period, and R. Crook, 'Decolonization
for an analysis of the agrarian factor.
'modernise' Indirect Rule, the CPP established itself as
the representative of some well identified general
interests.
First, in the already well established arenas of local
politics, the CPP was not just another local faction; it
was the party of centralism and the state against the
party of local autonomy, chiefly rule and all the legal,
tenurial and economic structures associated with the
colonial defence of 'traditional' culture.36 A large
proportion of the CPP's cadres, those who became
leading officials in the 1960s, had come through this
'school' of local politics.37 In the post-independence
centralisation process, the CPP managed to integrate
and coopt these locally-based elites - the only
organisation in Ghana's political history to have
achieved this, then or subsequently.
But the opposition to the CPP was equally well
entrenched. After 1954, the Ashanti national identity
was mobilised in defence of the neo-traditional and
established business classes, not just in Ashanti but
throughout Ghana. The regional dimension was
explicity expressed in the demand for a 'federal'
constitution, and just as fiercely attacked by the CPP,
which was attempting to articulate an ethnically
neutral, secular and popular nationalism. The conflict
was therefore national and split communities in
Ashanti as elsewhere; but the politicisation of
precolonial state and ethnic identities remained a
permanent potentiality for conflict. (The northern
regional interest turned out to be the weakest and most
easily coopted at the elite level).38
Secondly, the CPP represented a populism of the
'petty bourgeois'; its ideology of raising up the
'common man' and the black man (in Nkrumah's
Garveyite rhetoric) appealed to the less well educated
clerks, brokers and small businessmen of Ghanaian
society and of course, to the working class (until the
latter broke with the regime after independence).39
Ghana's professional middle classes, its established
businessmen and senior civil servants, were generally
hostile and supported the opposition. Although large
foreign companies have continued to operate in
Ghana (mining, trading, local manufacture and
services) since independence, an indigenous business
class has grown outside the state.4°
36 R. Crook, 'Legitimacy, Authority and the Transfer of Power in
Ghana', Political Studies, 35,4, 1987, p.568.
R. Crook, 'Bureaucracy and Politics in Ghana: a Comparative
perspective' in P. Lyon and J. Manor (vds.) Transfer and
Transformation: Political Institutions in the Neo' Commonwealth
(Leicester, 1983).
36 See: P. Ladouceur, Chiefs and Politicians: the Politics of Regionalism
in Northern Ghana (London, 1979).
° Crook, 'Legitimacy, Authority 'R. Rathbone, 'Businessmen ici
Politics: Party Struggle in Ghana 1949-57', Journal of Development
Studies, 9, (April 1973); R. Jeffries, Class, Potter and Ideology in
Ghana: the Railirarmen of Sekondi (Cambridge 1978).
40 P. Kennedy, African Capitalism: the Struggle for Ascendancy
(Cambridge, 1988).
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The demands of the 'popular' classes were easily
translated, once the CPP had state power, into
demands for the expansion of bureaucratic employ-
ment and the urban economy. The statist and
centralising logic of the state was of course already
powerfully present as it was in Côte d'Ivoire. But it
was the CPP's constituency, which sought social
mobility through state employment, that gave it a
politically irresistible push. The conflict with the
farmers over the state's decision to monopolise the
cocoa marketing system through the mechanism of the
Cocoa Marketing Board and the United Ghana
Farmers Council set a fateful seal on the new state's
attitude to the cocoa economy. The surpluses
accumulated from cocoa exports were to be used for
state-financed development and bureaucratic
expansion - exactly as in Côte d'Ivoire.41 But in
Ghana the industry was regarded as a convenient
milch cow whose historic fate was to be transcended
by a state-led industrialisation, not encouraged to
further expansion. This policy, later dubbed socialist
by Nkrumah, not only fitted the interests and statist
aspirations of the CPP's militant supporters, but also
accorded with their perception of the cocoa farmers as
an opposition. The most dynamic area of the cocoa
economy in the 1950s was Ashanti; but whereas the
Baoulé coffee farmers in Côte d'Ivoire were enjoying
the patronage of the French taxpayer and the colonial
state, the Ashanti cocoa farmers were regarded by the
CPP in much the same light as Mrs. Thatcher regarded
the British coal mining industry in the 1980s.
At the level of state institutions, the CPP state also
experienced early contestation. The Ghanaian civil
service was large and (compared to Côte d'Ivoire) well
established at the time of independence. The
administrative grades of the civil service were 80 per
cent Africanised by 1960;42 the service had already
developed an institutional identity, and was connected
socially with the educated elite and the university
intelligentsia. The CPP regime eventually came into
increasing conflict with the civil service and was
moving from oblique attacks and the creation of
parallel institutions to an outright politicisation just
before its overthrow. The immediate impact of the
CPP period on the civil service was increasingly poor
morale, bad discipline and internal conflict;43 the long
term result, as regime succeeded regime, an increasing
failure of accountability and retreat into formalism
and self-serving behaviour.
Unstable or permanently shifting patterns of attempted
politicisation also took their toll on the autonomy and
effectiveness of the service, its worst moment being
R. Crook, 'Farmers and the State' in: D. Rimmer (ed.), Rural
Transformation in Tropical Africa (London, 1988) p.129.
42B. Amonoo, Ghana 1957-66: the Politics of Institutional Dualism
(London, 1981) p.33.
° Amonoo, Institutional Dualism, p.6!; Killick, Development
Economics, p.338.
30
perhaps the 'purge' by the Busia regime in 1970. But
equally bad was the experience under military rule of
neglect alternating with wild demands, and the
constantly creeping spread of corruption and
cronyism. Yet through it all the public service
continued to expand and survive as an institution,
whilst suffering the results of permanent contestation
within the state. Unlike the Ivorian civil service which
was kept disciplined by the extreme nature of both the
rewards and sanctions controlled by the political elite,
and rarely questioned its subordination, the original
strength of the Ghanaian service made it an object of
contestation, so that it was permeated both by the
pulls of resistance and cooperation as well as the
conflicts of political factions and interests. Like the
army, it was an institution riven with ethnic rivalries
caused by the passage of recruitment cohorts.
The educated middle classes in Ghana also possessed
an early political significance. The University of
Ghana, founded in 1951, quickly became one of
Africa's leading institutions and a world leader in
African studies pioneered by a commited group of
expatriates and Ghanaians in the 1950s. Its values
were set by the 'Oxbridge' conceptions of its classicist
first Principal, and by the late l950s and early 1960s it
was producing a stream of well educated graduates.
Together with the expansion of the primary school
base and (unlike Côte d'Ivoire) the secondary system,
the result was the creation of relatively large (by
African standards) professional and lower middle
classes. By the mid-l960s the size and complexity of
the output from Ghana's three universities and its
teacher training colleges was such that the 'middle
classes' could not in any sense be encompassed by -
or catered to - by the state. Unlike the Ivorian scene,
the public sector could not absorb the products of the
higher and secondary system, and Africanisation was
virtually complete.44 White collar jobs required
constant state expansion - and the economy to
support that expansion.
The political salience and articulateness of this class
has been a constant feature of Ghanaian politics. The
university intelligentsia in particular asserted its
institutional and ideological independence from the
state in conflict with the CPP regime in the early l960s.
Lawyers and the legal profession have also played an
especially important role in political and economic
life, both as politicians and advocates for chiefly land
disputes and within Ghana's highly developed state
judicial system. The high point for these groups was
probablythe Busia regime of 1969-72; but they were
the groups to suffer most markedly - and protest
most vigorously - with the collapse of the monetary
system and the public and trading economy under the
Acheampong military government of 1972 to l978.
Under the Rawlings government, at least in its
° Clignet and Foster, 'Convergence and Divergence . . .' p.287.
'radical' phase, the British-style legal system has
suffered highly damaging and possibly fatal attacks on
its professionalism and independence.
Thus not only was the nascent Ghanaian state
opposed from the beginning by farmers, the neo-
traditional elites, professional, educated and business
classes and the forces of 'localism' and regionalism;
these forces were encouraged through electoral
politics, both local and national, to become nationally
organised and articulated. Even though the CPP
regime managed to incorporate or repress these
groups (and the trade unions) between 1960 and 1966,
the state was fully permeated and contested by these
social interests - particularly the local communities
- as its subsequent history has demonstrated. Further
periods of competitive party politics between 1969-72
and 1979-82 revealed the legacy of this period of
intense politicisation and mobilisation - as did the
conflicts which the military regimes have experienced.
Although the trajectory of statist bureaucratic
expansion and dominance has continued with only
minor interruptions, the pendulum has continued to
swing between localism and centralism, professional
and business classes against populism, cocoa farmers
against the state bureaucracy.
The first army regime (1966-69), was probably the first
to indulge in ethnic politics, perhaps because of the
prominent role of 'minority' officers from the Ewe and
Ga. But this was itself a reflection of the nature of the
army as an institution, one of the few in Ghanaian life
in which ethnicity had always been systematically and
self-consciously manipulated.46 The seizure of the
state by the army therefore brought into state
institutions a new type of contestation - one never
acknowledged by the CPP, but which it accused its
opponents of peddling - which had further corrosive
effects on subsequent regimes. The first army regime
itself eventually prepared the ground for a hand-over
to the CPP's opposition - the business and
professional classes and neo-traditional elites. But the
Busia regime was also troubled by accusations of
'Akan tribalism', although the 'Akan' labelwhich is
a language grouping - had never been used before in
Ghanaian politics and had no pre-colonial referent.
The regime in fact incorporated virtually all elements
including the north. It was only the 'Ewe' sensitivity
set up by the preceding military regime and the
attempt to stigmatise Busia's ex-CPP opponents in the
elections with the tribal label which set up this rather
' See: N. Chazan, An Anatomy of Ghana/an Politics. Managing
Political Recession 1969-82 (Boulder, Col., 1983); R. Price, 'Neo-
colonialism and Ghana's Economic Decline', Canadian Journal of
African Studies, 18, (1984); R. Jeffries, 'Rawlings and the Political
Economy of Underdevelopment in Ghana', African Affairs, 81,324,
(1982).
See: S. Baynham, The Military and Politics in Nkrumah's Ghana
(Boulder, Col., 1986) and 'Divide et Impera: Civilian Control of the
Military in Ghana's Second and Third Republics', .lournal of
Modern African Studies, 23,4, (1985).
theoretical opposition,
The succeeding military regime unfortunately created
a deepening whirlpool of ethnic and personal
factionalism within the army, the full violence of
which was only revealed in the first Rawlings upheaval
of 1979, Whilst most accounts of this mutiny of
soldiers and NCOs emphasise the 'radical' attack on
corruption, one should not forget the important role
played by northern and Ewe resentments.47 The ethnic
politics of the Acheampong regime were a symptom,
perhaps, of what Chazan has described as the virtual
privatisation of political channels, as the officer corps
turned in on itself, losing contact with and control
over the machinery of state - and over the hundreds
of officers given administrative jobs. Yet, at the same
time as the state machine was drifting, the government
publicly espoused the CPP's statist tradition in
economic policy and presided over the biggest
expansions in the bureaucracy and the most extreme
exploitation and corrupt mishandling of the cocoa
economy the country has ever known. It was no
accident therefore that the ethnic factionalism was
cross-cut publicly by opposition from the old 'anti-
CPP' social forces.
The elected PNP government which followed the first
Rawlings coup incorporated once again many of the
old CPP elements, at least in organisational terms, but
the social forces which had once underpinned the
CPP's populist rhetoric - the urban masses and lower
middle classes - were in fact excluded and
unrepresented. The PNP, in spite of its attempt to live
off the Nkrumah myths, was a fake. Unlike the CPP, it
had no capacity to integrate either the community-
based politics or the mobilised associations and class
forces of Ghanaian society. Nor could it cope with the
post-CPP legacy of ethnic mobilisation; and, crucially,
it showed absolutely no capacity to reestablish control
over the cocoa economy - or even to revive it, since it
could see no alternative to the flawed bureaucratic
instruments at its disposal.
The PNP's replacement - the second Rawlings
government - at first looked even weaker. The
PNDC has been firmly enmeshed, and has fought for
its survival, within the murky and violent world of a
distintegrating army, in which the authority of the
officer corps had been smashed,48 and ethnic and
personal cliques have fought amongst themselves.
Rawlings' 'Ewe' troops within the army have until
now ensured him victory, as evidenced by his success
in killing or demobilising most of his opponents,
particularly northern soldiers. (He has succeeded in
reducing the army around 12,000 to only 5,000 men.)49
Baynham, 'Divide et Impera ....., Haynes, 'Rawlings and the
Politics of Development. ..',pp.lQI and 122-8.
Baynham, 'Divide et Impera . .
Haynes, 'Rawlings . . .', p.363; also Ray, Ghana. . .; and Chazan,
'Politics and the State . .
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In relation to civil society, the regime appears to have
no organised base since it broke with the radical
student/intellectual movements and the urban workers
after the failure of the 'spontaneous' Workers and
Peoples Defence Committees. Even more ominously,
Rawlings' inner clique is publicly known to be an Ewe
and familial group.5° The ideological stance of the
regime is even more confusing; ip some senses the heir
to a CPP style populism, it has in practice shifted state
policy firmly towards favouring the encouragement of
cocoa exports and a better deal for farmers.
Ghanaian regimes have thus come full circle;
beginning with the CPP's fatal attempt to bureaucratise
the expropriation of the cocoa export surpluses, an
attempt which failed through the CPP's lack of control
over its bureaucratic creation, the cocoa farmers have
suffered the most comprehensively through all
regimes. Since the late 1970s, they have appeared
almost as demobilised as an Ivorian local electorate. It
is perhaps significant that their first champion in many
years, Jerry Rawlings, has also recently implemented a
plan for democracy which consists of elections at local
level to District Councils5' - an exact repetition of the
colonial reformers' assertion in the late 1940s that
truly representative democracy could only grow at the
local level. A hopeful interpretation of these moves is
that the Ghanaian state is attempting at last to re-
establish relations with elements of civil society long
neglected or hostile; and to reduce the degree of
contestation within the state to the point where
discipline and accountability can be rebuilt.
The particular formation of the Ghanaian state during
the 1950s and its mode of interaction with society since
independence have together produced an unstable
series of political elites, each failing to grapple with
and integrate the conflicts arising from a highly
mobilised and fractured civil society. In other polities,
the development of civil society and ofastate rooted in
that society is normally regarded as healthy. Why has
it been so destructive in Ghana? The explanation
offered here is that during the decolonisation process,
the state failed to create an uncontested source of
either power or legitimacy. As in Côte d'Ivoire, the
CPP reproduced the externality of the colonial state,
an externality rooted in bureaucratic extraction from a
peasant society with no organic connection to the state
through landlord or agrarian classes. But the CPP,
because of its 'statist' political constituency, not only
failed to establish a legitimate and effective
relationship with the peasant economy. It also
attacked the powerfully developed albeit pluralistic
sources of legitimacy in local society.
'°Haynes, 'Rawl,ngs . .', p.392. The key figure in the regime is
Rawl,ngs' personal mentor and friend over many years, Kojo
Tsikata, head of the security apparatus.
u See; West Africa, 'Ghana' Special Issue, 11Jan., 1988; 8. Ankomah,
'Elections Extraordinary', New African, Dec., 1988.
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Its attempt to build a secular nationalist elite might
have succeeded given time, power and resources. But
unlike the Ivorian elite, it did not have the autonomy,
power and wealth which came from that elite's ability
to pursue a strategy of 'internal colonialism' and to act
virtually independently of civil society. The CPP state
was too strongly contested right from the start; it
mattered that the character and representativeness of
the Ghanaian state was not agreed, and that one of the
regime's most fundamental interests, the peasant
economy, was alienated and excluded. 52 The political
economy of cocoa in Ghana was quite different from
that of Côte d'Ivoire; unlike the weak and scattered
Ivorian communities, unable to resist the flood of
migration and land-grabbing which was the hidden
and potentially subversive cost of the cocoa and coffee
boom, the cocoa-based communities of Ghana could
resist a state policy regarded as inimical, and the boom
of the 1950s did not split them so drastically into losers
and winners. Although leadership had passed from the
older Eastern Region cocoa areas, the Ashanti
controlled their own boom in the new areas.
From the CPP's initial political and economic failures,
embodied most vividly in the corrupt inefficiency of
the Cocoa Marketing Board and its monopoly
purchasing and political organisation, the United
Ghana Farmers Council, no subsequent regime
seemed able to escape.53 The state machinery
continued to expand, ever more out of control and
unaccountable as the grip of succeeding political elites
loosened and conflict within the state and with civil
society intensified. The cocoa marketing story
continued to be at the core of this failure, together with
failures in infrastructural support and agricultural
extension and lack of control over state agencies
responsible for implementation.54
The lack of discipline and acountability in the
Ghanaian state can therefore be attributed to the
continuing contestation within the state arising from
the lack of elite consensus and strength and from the
continuing ability of civil society to oppose and resist.
Inevitably the process was cumulative; each swing of
the wheel of fortune reduced the power of the next
group to seize the state.
It is worth putting the situation of the current regime
in Ghana into this historical context. The ideology of
the 'Rawlings revolution' initially stressed precisely
this need for 'accountability' and 'participation' in
Ghanaian public life; this was to be the purpose of the
new Peoples' and Workers' Defence Committees. Yet,
in assuming that the committees could emerge
The Kenyan state, as Medard snows, is beginning to experience the
same identity problems deriving from an inability to officially admit
the historically dominant role of the Kikuyu, whilst being unable
officially to exclude them either.
u Beckman, Organising the Farmers.
'4Killick, Development Economics, p.191.
'spontaneously' through self-selection, the leadership
showed itself astonishingly ignorant of the structure of
local and national politics in Ghana - and of the
materialist perspective underlying populist rhetoric.
No 'spontaneous' local committees could arise which
were not either emergent from the well-established
local political and social structures discussed above,
or, if opposed to them, supported by a national
organisation and/or the government's own admini-
strative networks.
Rawlings' PNDC had no such national political
organisation, and the field administrators were
unlikely to help or support the local committees
against the local establishment unless they were
reasonably confident in the survival of the regime and
could be relied upon to carry out the policy. The
PNDC in fact had no means of articulating itself,
either politically or administratively, into the
countryside. The outcome was entirely predictable.
Local committee members were regarded simply as
hooligans extorting and running rackets in scarce
imported goods where they could get the support of
the local soldiery; or challenging the authority of the
army, the police and the civil service (and hence the
regime's fragile bases) when successfully operating. In
Ashanti, local power structures simply crushed the
committees even before Rawlings made his own
decision to do the same." The current policy is based
on a return to a classic military/bureaucratic alliance
and the restoration of military and administrative
discipline (through fear and coercion), together with
an attempt to gain official purchase on the structures
of local democracy. These policy changes are entirely
explicable in terms of the object lesson which Rawlings
received in the realities of Ghanaian state-society
relations. Yet where there are already highly
politicised local elites such a strategy may be resisted
- or adapted to local interests.
State, Society and Institutional Efficacy
In attempting to explain the contrasting histories of
stability and instability in Ghana and Côte d'ivoire, it
has been argued that important differences existed in
both the relative weakness and strength of civil society
and in the type of interaction which occurred between
state and society during the crucial formative period of
each post-colonial state. The end result was, in Côte
d'Ivoire a strong state which overpowers, indeed is out
of all proportion to civil society, but which is able to
maintain a strongly disciplined state machine capable
R. Jeffries, 'Personal Rule.. .'; Haynes. 'Rawlings. .'. p.161. If the
government had decided to support the PDCs, a repressive
apparatus would no doubt have emerged; It S noteworthy that
Rawlings' original idea for a weekend 'National Cadre School' for
the PDCs focussed on 'weapons training'. Luckily for the ordinary
citizens of Ghana, Rawlings personal experience of meeting the
members of the PDCs in the flesh convinced him that it would be
best to cancel the whole idea (Flaynes, p.179).
of maintaining the conditions for extraction of
revenue from the peasant and mercantile economy.
The Ivorian state has been virtually autonomous; a
unified elite was able to use foreign factors of
production to create its resource base, and foreign
personnel to give itself continuing control over
administration (through restricted recruitment) and
over the private sector.
In Ghana, instability reflected the much greater
strength and articulation of civil society and the
inability of successive political elites to control or
integrate the permanent contestation either within the
state or over the acceptance of the state by different
interests. The consequence of this instability was a
growing lack of effectiveness, due to a lack of
accountability and control over the state machine.
This failure led in turn to an inability to maintain the
conditions for continued extraction from the peasant
and mercantile economies, and hence to the collapse
of the state's own revenue base.
The core of the difference is demonstrated in each case
in the history of the crop marketing systems. In Côte
d'Ivoire its efficiency does not reside in one institution
but in the whole range of state institutions dealing with
the countryside: the Caisse de Stabilisation, the
prefectoral field administration, the Ministries pro-
viding infrastructural inputs and the state agricultural
extension agencies such as SATMACI. Contrary to
what is often asserted, the Caisse system is not
'efficient' because it is based on private traders
working within an official price structure. The system
in Côte d'Ivoire is a classic piece of mercantilism, in
that it is designed to guarantee a profit to crop
exporters regardless of the world price. (The state
takes a profit if the world price is above the officially
imputed CIF price; but it reimburses the traders if it
falls below this - hence the current financial crisis of
the state !)56. . To be given a state licence tobe a crop
buyer and exporter is to be given a licence to make
money. This privilege is held by around 30 agencies
(some French, others Ivorian) each with a quota. But
because profit depends on maximum actual pur-
chasing, farmers benefit from competition between
the thousands of up-country agents of the big
commercial houses. The state regulates the grant of
trading licences right down to the sous-préfecture level
and control is strict. The system is thus built around
the interests of the traders, but farmers benefit because
they get the official price throughout the country and
actually get paid in cash (until the current crisis).57
Obviously the Caisse is at the core both of the state's
56 See: H. S. Marcussen, 'The Ivory Coast Facing the Economic Crisis'
in J. Carlsson (cd.) Recession in Africa (Uppsala, 1983) p.7;
G. Delaporte. 'La CSSPPA; Vingt Années au Service du Planteur et
de l'Etat', Marchés Tropicaux. 9 April 1976; F. R. Mahieu.
'Stabilisation des Prix de Produits Agricoles d'Exploitation et
Financement du Développement; l'Experience de la CSSPPA en
Côte d'ivoire', (Abidjan. CIRES. 1984).
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revenue surpluses and of the patronage system.
Although Fauré has referred to the system as
'patrimonial', it is doubtful whether the particular role
of the Caisse should be takenas proof that there is
appropriation and privatisation of state resources by
office holders throughout the state apparatus. On the
contrary, as Fauré shows, Houphouet-Boigny has
demonstrated a ruthless ability to 'call in', control or
close down the patronage machine as in the case of the
parastatal corporations when their excesses seemed to
threaten accountability and discipline throughout the
rest of the state.
The continuing departicipation of Ivorian society and
the externality of this powerful state is on the other
hand vividly demonstrated by the operations of the
prefectoral system and the current attempt at
communalisation and responsabilisation of local
administration and tax gathering.58 It is truly ironic
that, 30 years after independence a high level
administrative trainee at the Ivorian ENA could write
in relation to this policy: 'l'Ivoirien peut faire
maintenant son apprentissage de citoyen'. Control
within the administration and over society are still the
dominant realities of the Ivorian state.
In Ghana, the history of the crop marketing system
provides a telling contrast. Apart from a brief
interlude in the Busia regime when private upcountry
purchasing was tried (and failed) the marketing board
has consistently relied on buying and exporting all the
' The ability of the system to underwrite both traders' profits and
state financial demands even in a period of falling prices was finally
ended in 1987-8, caught in the scissors of further price falls and
Houphout's determination not to drop the producer price. Neither
the Caisse nor the banks were able to fund the advances needed to
buy the 1988 crop; hence, in a replay of the 1950s, the French
government has helped to 'arrange' a private purchase of a
substantial portion of the Ivorian crop at 'Houphoutt's price'. Even
though this is unlikely to solve the problem of the world price, it will
help the finances of the Caisse. This was followed in 1989 with a
halving of the producer price for cocoa. K. Whiteman, 'Bitter
Chocolate', West Africa, 12-18 June 1989; 'Quand l'Elysée se
passionne pour le Cacao', Le Canard Enchainé, 10 May 1989.
' Official justification for the policy may be found in Plan
Quinquennial 1981-85, p.752 where it is linked with deconcentration
of central ministries and the creation of extra rural sous-préfectures.
The major thrust of both the new communes and the sous-
prefectures is in fact to try to get local communities to pay for their
own 'development', a financial and political necessity in the period
of 'la crise'. Indeed, local areas are now being told that they must
raise the cost of having their own new sous-préfet. There is also open
official acknowledgement of the difficulty of getting the peasants to
pay their new communal taxes. See: Fraternité Matin, 19Nov. 1988;
FraternitéMatin. Spécial Indépendance, An 28, 'Communes: un Pari
sur l'Avenir', 7 Dec. 1988.
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crop itself using its own monopoly or near monopoly
agency. The Acheampong regime went further even
than the CPP and ordered the CMB to finance and
operate a massive expansion of state cocoa
plantations.59 Throughout, the farmers have suffered
abuses resulting from corruption and inefficiency such
as delayed payment (up to 9 months by the end of the
70s) or even non-payment. Meanwhile at a time when
world prices were booming and farmers only getting
15 per cent of those prices, the number of employees of
the CMB and its agencies had swelled to 74,357,
compared to the UGFC's 13,000 during the CPP
period.65 It is only under Rawlings that any changes
have looked likely, with the sacking of 28,000
employees and plans for privatisation.6'
What remains at the heart of the problem, however,
whatever system is adopted, is whether the Ghanaian
state can develop the administrative honesty and
efficiency to make it work and restore the conditions
for successful agriculture and trade to function. The
comparison with Côte d'ivoire shows that thecritical
factor is accountability to a strongly established
political elite. Given Ghana's turbulent political
history this may seem an unrealistic prospect. On the
other hand, the strength and mobilisation of
Ghanaian civil society could, if better harnessed and
integrated, provide a stronger basis for a participative
and civic order than in Côte d'Ivoire. A sense of
community still exists in Ghana and this is an
invaluable potential.
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